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1. Introduction
Conjoint analysis is one of the most widely used
quantitative market research methods (Bradlow 2005,
Green and Srinivasan 1990, Wittink and Cattin 1989).
By estimating how much a sample of consumers
value a specific set of features, this method allows
forecasting how these consumers (and, by approxi-
mation, the entire market) are likely to react to any
hypothetical set of new products. This enables prod-
uct developers to optimize the design and the pric-
ing of single products or of entire product lines (e.g.,
Kohli and Sukumar 1990, Mahajan et al. 1982).
However, one key limitation of preference measure-
ment methods such as conjoint analysis is the poten-
tial lack of motivation experienced by respondents
(e.g., Ding et al. 2005, Liechty et al. 2005, Netzer et al.
2008). There is a growing concern that the amount of
effort and attention spent by consumers when filling
out preference measurement questionnaires is lower
than when making real-life purchasing decisions,
and practitioners have called for preference mea-
surement methods that increase respondents’ level of
involvement. For example, Johnson (2008, p. 4) writes,
“Although respondents do seem to use simplification
strategies when filling out questionnaires, they prob-
ably work harder when making important real-life
choices. So simplification in answering questions is
not a good thing. We learn less than we might if
we pushed respondents to use deeper processing. We
need to find ways to do that.”
One of the significant recent contributions to the
preference measurement literature has been the intro-
duction of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which
offer additional motivation to respondents to pro-
vide truthful input. For example, Ding et al. (2005)
showed that the external validity of choice-based con-
joint (CBC) analysis is dramatically increased when
the responses given by consumers have an impact on
their compensation. In particular, the authors asked
consumers to make a series of choices, such that each
respondent had a positive probability of receiving
his or her preferred alternative from each choice set
after the end of the experiment. Ding (2007) extended
this method to situations in which the researcher
has access to only a few alternative products and
therefore is unable to offer all the alternatives in all
the choice sets as potential rewards. Whereas Ding
(2007) required estimating how much each respon-
dent would be willing to pay for each potential
reward product (based on that respondent’s choices),
Dong et al. (2010) showed that similar predictive
performance may be achieved by simply inferring
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the respondent’s rank ordering of the set of possible
reward products.
Researchers have also recently developed incentive-
compatible preference measurement tasks that deviate
further from traditional conjoint analysis. For exam-
ple, Ding et al. (2009) proposed an online incentive-
compatible preference measurement mechanism
inspired by barter markets. Park et al. (2008) proposed
a mechanism that relies on allowing participants to
upgrade products, where incentive-compatibility is
achieved by using the Becker–De Groot–Marschak
(BDM) procedure (i.e., the participant states his or
her willingness to pay for an upgrade, a random
price is generated, and the transaction is realized at
that price if and only if it is lower than or equal to
the stated willingness to pay).
The objective of incentive compatibility is to induce
truth telling, which requires participant involvement
and attention. (Note that involvement and attention
are not sufficient conditions for truth telling.) How-
ever, current incentive compatible preference mea-
surement methods may not increase involvement to
the level of real-life purchasing decisions. For exam-
ple, consider a consumer making a decision on which
laptop computer to purchase with his or her own
money. He or she may pay more attention to the infor-
mation relevant to that decision compared with a typ-
ical CBC context in which he or she is asked to make
many consecutive choices between laptop computers,
where each choice has only a probabilistic link to a
real outcome and where this outcome involves prize
money (as opposed to his or her own money).
In this paper we explore additional ways to increase
involvement and attention in preference measure-
ment while maintaining incentive compatibility. We
develop and test an incentive-compatible “Conjoint
Poker” (CP) game inspired by regular poker. In this
game, each card represents a product defined by a
combination of features. “Hands” are defined simi-
larly to regular poker (e.g., a pair is a hand in which
two products have one feature in common). The pref-
erence data revealed by respondents during this game
are comparable to incentive-compatible CBC data. We
develop a statistical efficiency measure and an algo-
rithm to construct optimal CP designs. We compare
incentive-compatible CP to incentive-compatible CBC
in a series of three experiments. Our first study, a
between-subjects online experiment, provides indirect
evidence that CP participants consider more of the
profile-related information presented to them com-
pared with CBC participants. We then conduct two
eye-tracking studies that provide convergent, direct
evidence for this effect.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In
§2 we introduce CP, develop a model to analyze data
from the game, a measure of statistical efficiency for
CP designs and an algorithm for constructing efficient
CP designs. We report the results of our experiments
in §3 and conclude in §4.
2. An Incentive-Compatible Poker
Game for Preference Measurement
In this section we describe an incentive-compatible
Conjoint Poker game. Different versions of the game
may be developed; we have developed four-card and
seven-card versions. The seven-card version, inspired
by Texas Hold’em, is described in the electronic com-
panion (available as part of the online version that can
be found at http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/). We
focus here on the four-card version, which is loosely
based on three-card poker.
2.1. Overview
Instead of using traditional playing cards defined by
two attributes (number and color) with 13 and 4 lev-
els, respectively, cards in this game represent prod-
uct profiles described by any number A of attributes
(A = 6 in our experiments), where each attribute a
has La levels. See Figure 1 for an example of a card.
Although our implementation is online, the game
may also be played off-line using physical cards. In
its online format, the game may be played between
multiple consumers or against the computer. Allow-
ing for multiple players raises several issues with
respect to design efficiency, estimation, and learning
and information diffusion among respondents (Ding
et al. 2009). We leave the investigation of multiple-
player versions to future research and focus in this
paper on versions of the game in which each respon-
dent plays against the computer only.
Figure 1 A Conjoint Poker Card
Color:
Warranty:
Security software:
Hard drive:
Accessory:
Price:
Obsidian black
2 years in-home
30 days
320 GB
$550
Black cordless mouse
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Figure 2 One Round of Conjoint Poker
Step 2. Hand selection stage: Player creates a three-card
hand. (Clicking on a card flips that card. Hand is composed
of cards left face up.)
Step 3. Card selection stage: Player indicates his or her
preferred card in the hand. He or she may receive the product
on that card (plus the difference between some preset
amount of money and the price of that product when price is
an attribute) if he or she wins that round. The probability
of winning is still positive but smaller in the case of a tie.
Step 4. Winner of the round is announced (based on hand
strength—ties are allowed).
Step 1. Four cards are presented to the player.
The game is played in rounds. Each round has two
stages, a hand selection stage and a card selection stage.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the steps involved
in each round. In the hand selection stage, each player
is asked to form a three-card hand from a set of
four cards. As in regular poker, a hand is a set of
cards that have a specific pattern. Hands have dif-
ferent strengths, and the winner in each round is the
player with the strongest hand (ties are allowed). The
strength of a hand is based on the probability that
this hand would be achievable from a random set of
four cards (drawn without replacement from the set
of all cards). Because the number of attributes and
levels in CP do not typically match those in regular
poker (two attributes with 13 and 4 levels, respec-
tively), the various types of hands are defined a lit-
tle differently, and the probabilities corresponding to
each hand need to be computed. These probabilities
are used to determine the relative strengths of the dif-
ferent hands (such that less likely hands have higher
strength) and will also be used in the choice model
developed below. See Appendix A for details on the
computation of these probabilities. We use the fol-
lowing six types of hands, listed from weakest to
strongest (see Figure 3 for an illustration):
—One pair (weakest): two cards have the same
level on one attribute.
—Straight: all three cards have different levels on
one attribute.
—Double straight: all three cards have different
levels on two attributes.
—Flush: all three cards have the same level on one
attribute.
—Straight flush: all three cards have the same level
on one attribute and different levels on another.
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Figure 3 Examples of Hands (from Weakest to Strongest): One Pair (a), Straight (b), Double Straight (c), Flush (d), Straight Flush (e), and
Double Flush (f)
+
(e)
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
(f)
One card
—Double flush (strongest): all three cards have the
same level on two attributes.
In the card selection stage, each player is asked to
indicate his or her preferred card from that hand.1
This information is used to provide incentives to
respondents, as described next.
2.2. Incentives
At the end of the experiment, one player is selected
randomly, and one of the rounds played by that
player is selected randomly. If the player won that
round, then he or she wins the product on his or her
preferred card. If price is one of the attributes, then
the player also receives the difference between a pre-
set amount of money and the price of that product.
If the player was tied for best in that round, he or
she receives the reward with a probability equal to
1 divided by the number of players in the tie. If the
1 In our implementation, players were asked to choose one card.
Other implementations may introduce a “no-choice” option.
player lost that round, then he or she receives noth-
ing (except for any potential nominal fee paid to all
respondents). In cases in which the experiment also
involves an external validity task, there is a positive
probability that the incentives will be based on that
task instead (see the setup of our experiments in §3).2
For the sake of argument, let us assume risk neu-
trality in the hand selection stage (this assumption
will be relaxed in our final model). We define the util-
ity of a card as the utility of the product on that card
plus the utility of the difference between the preset
amount of money and the price of that product, if
applicable. Given the incentive structure, the expected
utility derived by a respondent from a given round if
playing a given hand, h, is then proportional to the
2 This mechanism is based on the “random lottery procedure,”
which has been widely used and validated in experimental eco-
nomics (Starmer and Sugden 1991). See Ding et al. (2005, 2009) for
other applications of this procedure to incentive-compatible con-
joint analysis.
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probability of winning that round with h, multiplied
by the utility of the respondent’s preferred card in h:
Expected utility if play hand h ∝ Probability of winning
the round with h× Utility of preferred card in h.
This implies a trade-off. On the one hand, players
should play strong hands to increase the probability
that they will receive a prize. On the other hand, play-
ers should also play hands that contain cards that they
like in order to increase the utility from the potential
prize. This implies that the optimal strategy is neither
to always play the strongest hand nor to play a hand
that contains the card with the highest utility in each
round. In particular, it may be optimal to play a hand
that is not the strongest hand but contains a high-
utility card or to play a hand that does not contain
one’s favorite card but has a higher chance of winning
the round.
The above expression was provided only to illus-
trate the basic trade-off faced by CP participants. In
reality, we do not expect all consumers to be risk neu-
tral in the hand selection stage. In the next section,
we develop a choice model that captures this trade-off
without assuming risk neutrality.
2.3. Consumer Choice Model
We now propose a choice model that captures the
hand selection and card selection stages of CP. Let
i index consumers, r index the rounds in the game,
h index the possible hands available to players, and
j index the profiles (i.e., cards). When there are four
cards per round and when each hand consists of three
cards, each player has a choice between four possi-
ble hands in each round. We index these four hands
by h ∈ 811213149 and the four cards by j ∈ 811213149,
where h = 1 corresponds to the hand made of pro-
files 8112139, h = 2 corresponds to profiles 8213149,
etc. With a slight abuse of notation, we write j ∈ h
if card j is present in hand h. Let hi1 r be the hand
selected by consumer i in round r in the hand selec-
tion stage, and let ji1 r be the profile selected by that
consumer in the card selection stage among the pro-
files in hand hi1 r . To estimate partworths from the
choices made by consumers, we construct a likelihood
function for Pr({hi1 r1 ji1 r }). We have
Pr48hi1 r1 ji1 r95= Pr4hi1 r 5× Pr4ji1 r  hi1 r 50 (1)
The second component, Pr(ji1 r  hi1 r 5, corresponds to
the card selection stage in which consumer i chooses
one profile from a set and may be modeled simply
using logistic probabilities:
Pr4j  hi1 r 5=

exp4xji5∑
j ′∈hi1 r exp4xj ′i5
if j ∈ hi1 r1
0 otherwise1
(2)
where i corresponds to the partworths for con-
sumer i, and xj is an appropriately coded row vector
that captures the attribute levels in profile j .
The other term in Equation (1), Pr(hi1 r 5, corresponds
to the hand selection stage, which is unique to CP.
Here also, the consumer needs to make a choice
between a set of possible alternatives (i.e., hands).
In the case of risk neutrality, the expected utility
from choosing a hand is proportional to product of
the probability of winning with that hand and the
utility of the preferred card in that hand. Note that
whereas a utility intercept is not identified from the
card selection stage alone in the absence of a “no-
choice” option, such an intercept is identified from
the hand selection stage because of the possibility of
not winning anything in the round. In particular, if
we normalize the utility of not winning anything (i.e.,
of losing the round) to 0, then the expected utility
obtained by a risk-neutral consumer i from playing
hand h is equal to V i1 rh = Pwh  r 4i+maxj∈h8xji95, where
Pwh  r is the probability of winning round r by play-
ing hand h, and i is an intercept that captures con-
sumer i’s utility from winning a prize in the game. In
a two-player game, Pwh  r is equal to the probability
that the other player’s best hand is strictly weaker
than h plus half of the probability that the other
player’s best hand is exactly as good as h (ties are bro-
ken randomly). In our experiments, each consumer
played against the computer, the computer’s cards
were drawn randomly without replacement from the
set of all possible cards, and the computer always
played the strongest hand in each round. The result-
ing winning probabilities Pwh  r are computed in closed
form in Appendix A.
The above expression assumed risk neutrality in
the hand selection stage; i.e., the utility of the pre-
ferred card in a hand was assumed to have a pro-
portional influence on the player’s evaluation of the
hand. Risk-averse (respectively, risk-seeking) behav-
ior is obtained when that the player’s evaluation of
the hand is a concave (respectively, convex) function
of the utility of the preferred card in the hand. Mak-
ing the standard assumption of constant relative risk
aversion gives rise to the following expression:
V i1 rh = Pwh  r
(
i + max
j∈h
8xji9
)i
1 (3)
where i is the risk-aversion parameter for con-
sumer i. Risk neutrality is obtained when i = 1,
i < 1 gives rise to risk aversion in hand selection, and
i > 1 gives rise to risk-seeking behavior.
We then model consumer i’s choice in the hand
selection stage as
Pr4h5= exp4 ·V
i1 r
h 5∑
h′∈r exp4 ·V i1 rh′ 5
1 (4)
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where  is a logit scale parameter that captures
the possibility that the response error is different in
the hand selection and card selection stages (e.g.,
because of misrepresentations of the probabilities of
winning).3
2.4. Design Algorithm
When estimating partworths from conjoint analysis
data, the statistical efficiency of the estimates, typi-
cally measured by their asymptotic covariance matrix,
depends on the profiles shown to consumers. In
the case of CBC, this asymptotic covariance matrix
depends further on the partworth estimates them-
selves (Huber and Zwerina 1996). Under mild con-
ditions the asymptotic covariance matrix is equal to
the inverse of the information matrix (see, for exam-
ple, McFadden 1974, Newey and McFadden 1994).
A series of statistical efficiency measures have been
proposed, typically based on various types of matrix
norms (e.g., determinant, trace) applied to the infor-
mation matrix, and various design algorithms have
been proposed to select profiles that maximize effi-
ciency. In CBC, a common efficiency measure is
D-efficiency (based on the determinant norm), and
a common approach for creating D-efficient designs
is to obtain some prior information on the part-
worths and, given that information, to apply a set
of operators to transform a nonefficient design into
a D-efficient design (see, for example, Huber and
Zwerina 1996; Sandor and Wedel 2001, 2002, 2005).
Four properties characterize D-efficient CBC designs:
level balance (the levels of an attribute occur with
equal frequency), orthogonality (any two levels of dif-
ferent attributes appear in profiles with frequencies
equal to the product of their marginal frequencies),
minimal overlap (each attribute level repeats itself
within each choice set with minimal probability), and
utility balance (profiles in each choice are similarly
attractive).
This design approach may be extended to the con-
struction of efficient CP designs. The key difference is
in the computation of the information matrix. Given
our choice model above, the log-likelihood function is
equal to
L4data X11115
=∑
i
∑
r
log4Pr4hi1 r 55
+ log4Pr4ji1 r  hi1 r 55+ constant0
3 An alternative version of the game would be such that players still
win some amount of money if they lose the round. The same mod-
eling framework could be applied to a situation like this by sim-
ply replacing V i1 rh = Pwh  r 4i + maxj∈h8xj ·i95i with V i1 rh = Pwh  r 4i +
maxj∈h8xj ·i95i + 41 − Pwh  r 5 · i , where i would capture the utility
from winning the amount of money offered when the round is lost.
Taking the Hessian of the likelihood function with
respect to , we find that the expected value of
the information matrix ì is proportional to (see
Appendix B for details):4
ì = ∑
r
[∑
hr∈r
z˜rhr Pr4hr 5z˜
T
hr
+ Pr4hr 5
∑
j∈hr
zj hr Pr4j  hr 5zj hTr
]
1 (5)
where Pr4hr 5 is given by (4), Pr4j  hr 5 is given by (2),
and
z˜rhr =  ·ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
 ·ïV rh′r Pr4h′r 51
zj hr = xTj −
∑
j ′∈hr
xTj ′ Pr4j
′  hr 51
ïV rhr =Pwhr r 4+xj∗hr 5
−1xTj∗hr
1 where j∗hr =argmax
j∈hr
4xj50
The D-efficiency of any CP design may be computed
from the determinant of the corresponding informa-
tion matrix using the same formulas as the ones used
to compute the D-efficiency of a CBC design given
its information matrix. Moreover, the same opera-
tors (e.g., swapping, relabeling) used to improve the
D-efficiency of a CBC design may also be used to
improve the D-efficiency of a CP design.
One important difference between CP and CBC is
that efficient CP designs tend to have more level
overlap compared with efficient CBC designs such as
those considered here (i.e., standard logit designs).5
Minimal overlap occurs when attribute levels are
repeated within a choice set as little as possible. For
example, in our experiments we achieved no overlap
in our CBC design; i.e., each level of each attribute
appeared exactly once in each choice set, leading to
maximal design efficiency. In contrast, some overlap
is actually desirable in CP designs. Indeed, in a CP
design with no level overlap, all hands in all rounds
are equally strong (all hands are double straights, and
Pwh  r is constant for all r and h), and the intercept i
and risk-aversion parameter  i are not identified (all
hands have the same probability of winning).
In our field study, we followed Huber and Zwerina
(1996) and conducted a pretest from which we
4 The expression in Equation (5) assumes a homogeneous partworth
vector  (Huber and Zwerina 1996). In Appendix B, we provide
the information matrix for the mixed logit model. This information
matrix involves integrals and does not have a closed form (Sandor
and Wedel 2002). For computational simplicity, the designs used
in our experiments assume a homogeneous partworth vector (i.e.,
standard logit model).
5 Sandor and Wedel (2002) showed that efficient mixed logit designs
tend to have more level overlap compared with efficient standard
logit designs.
Toubia et al.: Measuring Consumer Preferences Using Conjoint Poker
144 Marketing Science 31(1), pp. 138–156, © 2012 INFORMS
obtained prior estimates (our pretest had 56 and 58
respondents in the CBC and CP conditions, respec-
tively). We then applied the relabeling and swapping
operators to improve the D-efficiency of a design that
was selected as a starting point (see, for example,
Huber and Zwerina 1996; Sandor and Wedel 2001,
2002, 2005). For CBC, we used a D0-efficient design
with no overlap as a starting point (a D0-efficient
is a D-efficient design assuming that all partworths
are equal to 0). This D0-efficient design was obtained
using the standard cyclic approach of Bunch et al.
(1994): starting with an orthogonal design, a set of
choice alternatives was constructed by adding cycli-
cally generated alternatives to each set. For CP, we
used a perturbed version of that D0-efficient design
as a starting point, where the perturbation was per-
formed in order to introduce some amount of level
overlap.6
3. Experiment Details
We now report the results of three experiments
that compared incentive-compatible CP to incentive-
compatible CBC. Our first study was a between-
subjects online experiment that enabled us to compare
the partworth estimates across the two methods and
provided indirect evidence that CP participants con-
sidered more of the profile-related information pre-
sented to them compared with CBC participants.
Studies 2 and 3 are within-subjects eye-tracking stud-
ies that enabled us to measure more directly the
amount of information considered by respondents
under the two methods.
3.1. Setup
The setup of all three studies was similar. CBC and CP
were implemented on the same online platform with
the same user interface. See Figure 2 for screenshots
of the CP interface and Figure 4 for screenshots of the
CBC interface. We used mini laptops as our product
category. Each of our product profiles was a differ-
ent customized version of the Dell Inspiron Mini 11z
laptop computer. The display (1106" high-definition
6 The cyclic approach of Bunch et al. (1994) is such that if attribute
a is at level l in the qth profile of the orthogonal design, then it is
at level l in the first card in the qth question of the choice design,
level l+ 1 in the second card, etc. In other words, starting from the
orthogonal design, the level of each attribute is incremented by 1
for each new card in the choice set. In our perturbed version, it was
incremented with probability 1−t instead of 1. Therefore if attribute
a was at level l in the qth profile of the orthogonal design, it was
at level l in the first card in the qth round of Conjoint Poker. The
value in the second card was then equal to l+ 1 with probability
1 − t and to l with probability t. The value in the third card was
then equal to that in the second card plus 1 with probability 1 − t
and equal to that in the second card with probability t, etc. We used
t = 00350
WLED display), processor (1 3 GHz Intel® Celeron 743
processor), RAM (2 GB), battery (28WHr lithium-ion
battery), operating system (Genuine Windows® Vista
Home Edition), and webcam (integrated 1.3 M pixel
webcam) were held constant. Six attributes were var-
ied, with four levels each: design (four different color
schemes: promise pink, obsidian black, jade green,
or ice blue), warranty (1-year limited, 1-year limited
with in-home service after remote diagnosis, 2-year
limited with in-home service after remote diagnosis,
or 3-year limited with in-home service after remote
diagnosis), McAfee® SecurityCenter antivirus (30-day,
15-month, 24-month, or 36-month subscription), hard
drive (120 GB, 160 GB, 250 GB, or 320 GB), accessory
(Logitech® black cordless mouse, Logitech red cordless
mouse, Linksys wireless router, or Creative Labs head-
phones), and price ($500, $550, $600, or $650). Given
this price range, and given the fact that Dell laptops
are customizable, we were able to offer any product
profile as an incentive (like in Ding et al. 2005).7
In each study, the flow of the experiment was as
follows, for each respondent:
1. Instructions: Detailed instructions (using picture
illustrations) were displayed on the introductory page.
Care was taken to make the instructions in both condi-
tions as symmetric as possible. In addition, we created
a slide show for each condition with a shorter ver-
sion of the instructions, which we embedded at the top
of the page (using http://www.authorstream.com—
slide shows and instructions are available from the
authors upon request). The slide shows in both condi-
tions used similar language (e.g., in both conditions,
profiles were referred to as “cards”). Throughout the
experiment, a link to the instructions was available to
participants.
2. External validity task: As an external validity task,
participants were asked to select one card from a
set of eight. See Figure 5 for a screenshot. The for-
mat of the external validity task and the set of eight
profiles were identical across conditions and partic-
ipants. These eight profiles were randomly selected
subject to a level-balancing constraint (each level
of each attribute appears exactly twice across pro-
files) and such that exactly two of the four ordered
attributes (warranty, security software, hard drive,
price) were at one of the two most attractive levels in
each profile. This last constraint was added to avoid
dominance.
3. Main task: Participants in the CBC condition were
given 20 CBC questions, each with four alternatives.
Participants in the CP condition were asked to play
20 CP rounds against the computer. (CP participants
were given two practice rounds between Steps 2
7 Although appealing, this property is not required. See, for exam-
ple, Ding (2007) and Dong et al. (2010).
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Figure 4 One CBC Question
and 3.) See Figures 2 and 4 for screenshots from each
condition. The CBC and CP designs were selected to
be D-efficient as explained above. The only exception
is the second eye-tracking study (Study 3), in which
Figure 5 External Validity Task
both designs were identical. Within each condition,
the design was identical across respondents.
4. Follow-up questionnaire: Participants were ad-
ministered a short follow-up survey that measured
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their feedback on the task, their knowledge of regular
poker, and how much they would need to be paid in
order to participate in a similar study in the future.
(More details are provided in §3.2.3.)
3.2. Study 1
Our participants were recruited from a commercial
online panel typical of online market research. Par-
ticipants were not screened based on their knowl-
edge of poker or any other criteria. Respondents
accessed the experiment from the Internet. We used
a between-subjects design with N = 318 in each con-
dition. Respondents were given a flat nominal incen-
tive to participate (in the form of points that may
be redeemed for rewards), in addition to the fol-
lowing incentives. In both conditions participants
were informed (in Step 1) that one participant would
be selected randomly at the end of the study and
that one of the tasks (external validity or CBC in
the incentive-compatible CBC condition, or external
validity or CP in the incentive-compatible CP con-
dition) would be randomly selected for that partici-
pant. If the external validity task was to be selected,
the winner would receive the product on his or her
preferred card and the difference between $650 and
the price of that product. If the CBC task was to be
selected, then one of the 20 CBC questions would
be selected, and the winner would receive his or her
preferred card from that question and the difference
between $650 and the price of that product. If the CP
task was to be selected, then one of the rounds would
be randomly selected. If the selected respondent was
to have won this round, then he or she would receive
the product on his or her preferred card in that hand
and the difference between $650 and the price of that
product. If the selected respondent was to have lost
this round, then he or she would receive nothing
(with the exception of the flat incentive offered to all
respondents). If the selected respondent was to have
been tied with the computer in this round, then he
or she would receive the prize with probability 0.5.
Note that the incentives given to the participants in
the CP condition were smaller in expectation com-
pared to the CBC condition, making the comparisons
conservative.
3.2.1. Parameter Estimates. We estimated the
respondents’ partworths in each condition using hier-
archical Bayes (HB) (Rossi and Allenby 2003). Details
are provided in Appendix C. In each condition, the
first stage prior on i was normal: i ∼ N401D5.
In the CP condition, we also specified priors on
i (risk-aversion parameter) and i (intercept):
i ∼ TN401D 5 (truncated between 0 and 2 for
numerical stability) and i ∼ N401D5. Table 1
reports the estimates of the population means of
all partworths (i.e., posterior mean of the first-stage
prior parameters) as well as 95% credible intervals
for these population means and the point estimate
of the standard deviation of each parameter across
consumers (i.e., the square root of the diagonal
terms of the matrix D5. We used effects coding
such that the partworths always sum to 0 within
an attribute. We see that the average partworth
estimates obtained from the two methods are fairly
different. In fact, the 95% credible intervals do not
overlap for 9 out of the 24 attribute levels. The
partworth estimates based on incentive-compatible
CBC are also more heterogeneous than those based
on incentive-compatible CP. The average standard
deviation (across attribute levels) of the partworths
is equal to 0.748 with incentive-compatible CBC and
0.414 with incentive-compatible CP. The partworths
obtained from incentive-compatible CBC are also
more varied at the individual level. In particular,
the average across respondents of the ratio between
the importances of the most and the least important
attributes is 20.238 under incentive-compatible CBC
compared with 11.803 under incentive-compatible CP.
Further analysis of the raw data provides an expla-
nation for these differences. In particular, a substantial
proportion of respondents in the incentive-compatible
CBC condition made all of their CBC choices based
on a very limited subset of attributes and levels. For
example, 74 of the 318 participants in the incentive-
compatible CBC condition selected profiles that all
had one attribute in common (e.g., all the profiles
selected across the 20 CBC questions had 320 GB hard
drives). Recall that D-efficient CBC designs have min-
imal overlap; i.e., each attribute level repeats itself
within each choice set with minimal probability. In
our case, a design with no overlap was available; i.e.,
in each choice set, each attribute level was present
exactly once. This implies that partworth estimates
for these respondents are very uneven and are only
identified through shrinkage. Consider, for example,
a respondent who always selects laptops with 320 GB
in all CBC questions. Because there is only one 320 GB
laptop in each question, the choice data from this
respondent may be fitted perfectly by assigning a
very large positive partworth to 320 GB and smaller
weights to all other attribute levels, giving rise to
uneven partworth estimates. Moreover, the only infor-
mation contained in this respondent’s data is that
320 GB is greatly preferred to all other partworths,
but no information is provided on how large the
difference is or on the relative preferences for the
other attribute levels.8 Therefore this respondent’s
8 More precisely, as long as the partworth for 320 GB minus the
partworth for the next level of this attribute is greater than the sum
over all other attributes of the highest minus the lowest partworths,
the respondent would always prefer the laptop with 320 GB, irre-
spective of the other attribute levels.
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Table 1 Partworth Estimates
Parameter Incentive-compatible CBC CP
Color
Promise pink 003861 6001801005977110449 −004981 6−006011−004007100598
Obsidian black −006101 6−008021−004347110078 002151 6001131003257100375
Jade green 002761 6001261004197100873 001221 6000391002027100361
Ice blue −000521 6−005811004967100999 001621 6−001271004497100360
Warranty
1-year limited −000221 6−001441001067100789 −003641 6−004371−002977100280
1-year in-home −001111 6−002121−000107100581 −003761 6−004531−002997100354
2-year in-home 000181 6−000581001007100343 002461 6001921003137100182
3-year in-home 001151 6−001961004157110032 004931 6002821006987100535
Security software
30 days −002291 6−003611−001057100709 −003401 6−004161−002487100294
15 months −000911 6−001601−000137100229 −002081 6−002911−001347100172
24 months −000541 6−001731000597100464 001831 6001221002447100197
36 months 003751 6000331006947100441 003651 6001381005857100321
Hard drive
120 GB −008941 6−101501−006137110174 −103371 6−104991−101797110089
160 GB −005551 6−007021−004037100905 −005991 6−006801−005147100460
250 GB 005331 6003921006787100809 005291 6004391006077100370
320 GB 009161 6003391104607110727 104071 6100861107417110197
Accessory
Black mouse −001421 6−002481−000287100572 000471 6−000131001097100273
Red mouse −002281 6−003211−001467100424 −001031 6−001661−000397100251
Wireless router 004731 6003041006387110214 002121 6001271002947100462
Headphones −001041 6−004641002657100402 −001551 6−003641000527100309
Price
$500 −000421 6−001621000737100475 −000691 6−001571000247100391
$550 −000641 6−001621000207100387 −000011 6−000861000767100331
$600 000981 6000041001847100254 −000181 6−000801000387100191
$650 000081 6−002761003207100616 000881 6−001371003237100583
Notes. The population means estimate is reported first. The 95% credible interval of the population means estimate
is reported second in brackets, and the point estimate of the standard deviation of the parameter across consumers
is reported last.
partworths are identified only because of shrinkage;
i.e., without the shrinkage performed by HB, the like-
lihood function corresponding to such a respondent
would not have a finite maximum.9
Interestingly, the 74 incentive-compatible CBC
respondents who selected profiles that were always
similar on one attribute may actually be grouped
based on the attribute level that is common across
their preferred profiles. For example, 29 of these
respondents always selected laptops with 320 GB
hard drives, 13 always selected laptops with wireless
routers, and 9 always selected pink laptops. Because
there was no level overlap in the D-efficient CBC
design, within each of these groups, all respondents
gave the exact same answers to all CBC questions. In
fact, 90 of the 318 incentive-compatible CBC respon-
dents (28.30%) gave answers that were completely
9 Johnson (2008, p. 3) also notes the limitations of questionnaire
designs with minimal overlap when respondents “use simplifica-
tion strategies, such as always choosing a preferred brand, or the
lowest price, or the most extreme level of some other attribute.”
identical to the answers of at least one other respon-
dent in that condition. Such a phenomenon was not
present in the CP data. None of the CP respondents
gave answers that were all similar to the answers of
another CP respondent, and none of the CP respon-
dents selected profiles that all had one attribute in
common.
Although the evidence so far is only indirect, these
observations suggest that CBC respondents consid-
ered less of the profile-related information when mak-
ing their choices compared with CP respondents. The
next two studies confirm this phenomenon by provid-
ing direct evidence from eye-tracking data.
Finally, we discuss the estimates of the other
parameters that are unique to CP. Table 2 reports
the estimates of , 0, and 0, and Figure 6 reports
the distribution of the estimates of the risk-aversion
parameter i across CP participants. For each respon-
dent, we construct a 95% credible interval for i0 For
3 of the 318 respondents, the upper bound of this
credible interval is below 1, which corresponds to
risk aversion in the hand selection stage. For 93 of
Toubia et al.: Measuring Consumer Preferences Using Conjoint Poker
148 Marketing Science 31(1), pp. 138–156, © 2012 INFORMS
Table 2 Additional Conjoint Poker Parameters
Parameter Posterior mean [95% credible interval]
 0.064, [0.027,0.126]
0 43.741, [34.175,51.752]
0 1.121, [0.905,1.304]
Note. The 95% credible intervals are reported in brackets.
the 318 respondents, this credible interval is above 1,
which corresponds to risk seeking in the hand selec-
tion stage. Therefore, our results suggest that a signif-
icant proportion of CP participants are risk seeking in
their selection of hands. Note that risk-seeking behav-
ior is not uncommon in settings such as this one (see,
for example, Thaler and Johnson 1990).
3.2.2. Performance Comparisons. As we show
later, our eye-tracking studies suggest that respon-
dents consider only a subset of the profile-related
information contained in the external validity task.
This raises questions about the ecological validity of
such tasks in general and about their ability to detect
a deeper level of processing in the calibration task in
particular. Indeed, it is unclear how a deeper level of
processing in the calibration task would impact pre-
dictive performance in the validation task, if the level
of processing in the validation task itself is not as
deep. With this caveat, in this section we compare the
predictive performance of CBC versus that of CP for
completeness.
We refer to the respective choice shares of the
eight profiles in the external validity task based on
the entire sample (i.e., both conditions combined—
636 respondents) as the “observed out-of-sample
aggregate choice shares.” For each method, we com-
pute at each posterior draw in the Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) the logistic probability that
each respondent will choose each of the eight profiles
Figure 6 Distribution Across Conjoint Poker Participants of the Point
Estimate of the Risk-Aversion Parameter i
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in the external validity task. Averaging these proba-
bilities across posterior draws gives us point estimates
of each respondent’s choice probabilities in the exter-
nal validity task. We use these estimated probabilities
to compute hit rates (where the prediction is that each
respondent will choose the profile with the highest
predicted choice probability). We also measure how
well the aggregate predictions made by each method
coincide with the observed out-of-sample aggregate
choice shares. We compute an estimate of the out-of-
sample aggregate choice shares at each posterior draw
in the MCMC by averaging the choice probabilities
across respondents. Point estimates are obtained by
averaging these estimates across posterior draws. The
accuracy of these predictions is measured using the
mean absolute deviation (MAD), the correlation, and
the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the pre-
dicted and observed out-of-sample aggregate choice
shares. For all performance metrics, we also report
95% credible intervals across posterior draws. We note
that the accuracy of out-of-sample choice share pre-
dictions is typically assumed to be highly correlated
with the accuracy of out-of-sample individual-level
predictions, and it is therefore often not reported in
papers on CBC. However, we will see that this corre-
lation may not be as high as is usually assumed.
The results are reported in Table 3. The hit rates
achieved by incentive-compatible CBC and incentive-
compatible CP are not significantly different (i.e., the
95% credible intervals overlap10). However, incentive-
compatible CP produces out-of-sample aggregate
choice share predictions that are significantly more
accurate than those produced by incentive-compatible
CBC. In fact, the aggregate choice share predic-
tions based on incentive-compatible CBC are worse
than chance.11 Table 4 gives the actual and pre-
dicted choice shares for each profile in the external
validity set. The fact that incentive-compatible CBC
predicts out-of-sample individual choices well but
predicts out-of-sample aggregate choice shares poorly
is counterintuitive and worthy of subsequent inves-
tigation. In particular, future research may test the
replicability and generalizability of this finding and
identify its cause.
3.2.3. Follow-up Questionnaire. After complet-
ing the task, subjects in both conditions answered a
follow-up questionnaire. The goal of this question-
naire was to further test the level of engagement of
10 The difference is not significant either when comparing the two
sets of hit rates using a t-test (p-value = 0074).
11 The difference between the accuracy of the out-of-sample choice
share predictions made by the two methods is even more pro-
nounced when the accuracy of each method is evaluated based on
the shares observed in that same condition (details available from
the authors upon request).
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Table 3 Out-of-Sample Predictions
Individual-level predictions: Choice share predictions: Choice share predictions: Choice share predictions:
Hit rate MAD correlation RMSE
Incentive-compatible CBC 0.330 [0.296,0.368] 0.0691 [0.0603,0.0757] 0.432 [0.354,0.522] 0.0814 [0.0715,0.0902]
CP 0.318 [0.236,0.315] 0.0267 [0.0208,0.0337] 0.890 [0.839,0.921] 0.0312 [0.0265,0.0387]
Notes. Based on external validity task. A null model predicting equal choice probabilities across eight profiles would achieve a hit rate of 0.125, a MAD of
0.0623, and a RMSE of 0.0667 (correlation is not defined when all share predictions are equal). The 95% credible intervals are reported in brackets.
Table 4 Detailed Choice Share Predictions
Profile description Observed Choice share predicted by Choice share
choice incentive-compatible predicted by
Color Warranty Security software Hard drive Accessory Price ($) share (%) CBC (%) CP (%)
Pink 1 yr in-home 36 mos 320 GB Red mouse 600 17092 32042 19089
Green 1 yr limited 30 days 250 GB Headphones 550 3062 11099 6095
Blue 2 yrs in-home 36 mos 160 GB Wireless router 650 19065 14034 16065
Black 3 yrs in-home 24 mos 160 GB Wireless router 600 16035 14021 17047
Pink 3 yrs in-home 24 mos 120 GB Headphones 650 3014 7091 5006
Green 1 yr limited 15 mos 320 GB Red mouse 550 19034 10026 21070
Blue 2 yrs in-home 15 mos 120 GB Black mouse 500 5082 5031 4060
Black 1 yr in-home 30 days 250 GB Black mouse 500 14015 3057 7068
the respondents and to test their knowledge of regu-
lar poker.
Engagement. Our results so far (and the eye-tracking
studies reported next) suggest that CP participants
consider a greater proportion of the profile-related
information compared with CBC respondents when
making their choices. This increased effort is also
reflected in the time spent by participants on the task.
The average time used by CP participants to com-
plete 20 rounds of CP was 1,335.44 seconds, compared
to an average time of 625.76 seconds to complete 20
CBC questions in the other condition. To the extent
that a longer response time is a sign of increased
information processing, this is not necessarily a nega-
tive feature. However, from a managerial perspective,
a longer response time may indicate that consumers
would demand higher incentives to participate in a
CP study compared to a CBC study (holding the num-
ber of rounds/questions constant). This would imply
that for a fixed budget, more consumers could be sur-
veyed using CBC compared to CP.
Our follow-up questionnaire allowed us to investi-
gate these issues. Respondents were asked to indicate
on a five-point scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to
5 (“strongly agree”) how much they agreed with the
following statements:
• “Participation in this study was fun.”
• “The instructions were complex.”
• “Participation in this study required a lot of
effort.”
• “Participation in this study required a lot of
time”
In addition, in the spirit of Dong et al. (2010),
we measured how much money respondents in each
condition would require in order to participate in a
similar study in the future. Participants were given
the following instructions:
We often run studies similar to this one, using the
same methodology but on products different from lap-
top computers. Would you like to participate in such
future studies? Assuming that your only compensa-
tion would be a fixed payment (i.e., you would not
be entered into a lottery to win a product), how much
would that compensation need to be for you to be
willing to participate in a similar study of the same
length? Please enter an amount in dollars below. We
will invite you to a future study of the same length
only if the payment for that study is at least as large
as the amount that you write. Otherwise, we will not
send you an invitation.
As expected, compared to participants in the
incentive-compatible CBC condition, participants in
the CP condition found the instructions significantly
more complex (2.81 versus 1.74; Wald = 121003,
p < 0001), found that the study required significantly
more effort (2.70 versus 1.84; Wald = 79028, p < 0001),
and found that it was significantly more time con-
suming (2.96 versus 2.06; Wald = 79056, p < 0001).
However, they also thought that the study was sig-
nificantly more “fun” (average scores of 4.12 ver-
sus 3.97; Wald = 6090, p < 0001), and the amounts
of money that they requested in order to participate
in a similar survey in the future were similar. In
both conditions, the median was equal to $5.00. (The
average was significantly higher in the CBC condi-
tion because of the presence of outliers.) Moreover, a
Kolmogorov–Smirnoff (K-S) test could not reject the
null hypothesis that the amounts provided in the two
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conditions come from the same distribution (K-S =
00082, p= 0023).
To conclude this analysis, incentive-compatible CP
is perceived as being more complex, more effortful,
and more time consuming, and it is objectively more
time consuming compared with incentive-compatible
CBC. But it is also perceived to be more enjoyable,
and consumers do not request higher incentives to
participate in a CP versus a CBC study, holding the
number of rounds/questions constant.
Knowledge of Regular Poker. Our follow-up ques-
tionnaire also tested the respondents’ knowledge
of traditional poker using a six-question quiz (see
Appendix D—none of the answers to these questions
could be inferred from the previous tasks). We cre-
ated a score for each respondent equal to the num-
ber of correct answers. First, as expected, we found
that there was no significant difference in the aver-
age score across the two conditions (4.48 versus 4.55;
t = 00708, p-value = 0048). The proportion of respon-
dents with perfect scores was also not significantly
different across the two conditions (36.79% versus
34.59%; z = 00579, p = 0072). We tested whether CP
affects the partworths estimates differently for poker
experts versus nonexperts. Although we may expect
poker experts to have preferences that systematically
differ from those of other consumers (related to dif-
ferences in gender, age, etc.), it is important that the
CP interface does not bias or distort the preferences of
poker experts relative to nonexperts. We reestimated
the partworths in each condition with a first-stage
prior of i ∼ N40 +1Experti1D5, where Experti was
a binary variable equal to 1 if respondent i received
a perfect score on the poker quiz. The vector 1 was
estimated directly within the MCMC sampler (see, for
example, Lenk et al. 1996). The 95% credible inter-
vals for all 24 attribute levels captured by 1 in the
CBC condition overlap with those in the CP condi-
tion. This suggests that the CP task itself does not dis-
tort or biases the preferences of poker experts relative
to nonexperts.
Our results so far are consistent with CBC respon-
dents making their choices based on a smaller subset
of the profile-related information presented to them
compared with CP respondents. The following two
eye-tracking studies provide direct evidence that CP
participants consider more of the profile-related infor-
mation presented to them compared with CBC par-
ticipants. These studies also shed some light on the
source of this difference, by separating the effect of
differences in designs (i.e., sets of cards) from the
effect of differences in the methods themselves.
3.3. Study 2
Eye-tracking has been used by several authors in mar-
keting to model visual attention for brands, ads, and
in-store marketing (e.g., Chandon et al. 2009, Pieters
and Wedel 2004, Wedel and Pieters 2000). In our set-
ting, if CBC participants make their choices based on
a smaller subset of attributes, they should consider a
smaller proportion of the profile-related information
available to them, resulting in decreased visual atten-
tion for a large proportion of attributes and levels.
Participants in our eye-tracking studies were
recruited at a large European university. The study
was run in a special eye-tracking lab, with a free-
standing, nonintrusive eyetracker. The eye-tracking
apparatus was a Tobii® 2150 tracker, sampling
infrared corneal reflections at 50 Hz with a 0.35 spa-
tial resolution and an accuracy of 0.5. Stimuli were
presented on the 21-inch LCD monitor of the eye
tracker, controlled by a PC with a display resolution
of 1,600 × 1,200 pixels. The position of the partici-
pant’s left eye and right eye was recorded separately
(Van der Lans et al. 2011). After calibration of the eye
tracker, respondents participated in the online study
on the eye-tracking screen in exactly the same man-
ner as in the main experiment. Each participant com-
pleted both CBC and CP in a counterbalanced order
(in both Studies 2 and 3, similar results are obtained
when using data from the first task only, thereby cre-
ating a between-subjects design).
Eye movements primarily consist of fixations and
saccades (Wedel and Pieters 2000). Fixations are dis-
crete periods of time (about 200–500 milliseconds)
where the eye hardly moves. During this phase,
information is extracted. Saccades are quick jumps
(20–40 milliseconds) between fixation locations. To
identify eye-fixations from the recordings of the point
of regard, we used a recently developed velocity-
based algorithm (Van der Lans et al. 2011). Each CBC
question and each CP round involved four cards with
six attributes each. We identified the coordinates of
the 6 × 4 = 24 cells on the screen that correspond to
each of these 24 areas, and we computed the number
of fixations in each of these 24 cells.
In this study, the respective designs (i.e., sets of
cards) used for CBC and CP were identical to those
used in Study 1, and the sample size was N = 17. The
results confirm that CP participants consider more of
the available information compared with incentive-
compatible CBC participants. In particular, CP par-
ticipants considered (i.e., had at least one fixation in
the hand selection stage or card selection stage) on
average 21.71 of the 24 cells containing the descrip-
tion of the cards (where the average is taken across
the 20 rounds and across all participants), whereas
incentive-compatible CBC participants considered on
average 14.30 of the 24 cells.12 The difference in
12 In the hand selection stage of Conjoint Poker only, participants
considered on average 20.35 of the 24 cells, and in the card selection
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Figure 7 Study 2—Average Proportion of Cells Considered by Participants in Each Condition
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Note. Each cell contains the level of one attribute for one alternative.
the average number of cells across respondents is
statistically significant (paired t-test, p-value < 0001),
and all respondents considered more cells on aver-
age under CP versus CBC. The eye-tracking data also
suggest that the amount of information considered
by respondents tends to decrease as the study pro-
gresses; see Figure 7. A binomial regression with a
logistic link of the proportion of cells visited in each
question on the question number reveals a significant
negative trend for CBC respondents (p-value < 0001)
and a marginally significant negative trend for CP
respondents (p-value ≈ 000850
We also report the amount of profile-related infor-
mation considered in the external validity task. With
eight profiles, there are 6 × 8 = 48 cells. We compute
the average number of cells considered by partici-
pants in the external validity task the first time they
were exposed to the task (irrespective of whether they
completed CBC or CP first; the external validity task
came before the main task). Participants considered
on average 33.24 of the 48 cells. The fact that more
than 30% of the cells were not considered on aver-
age raises questions on the ability of such external
validity tasks to capture real-world decisions. Future
research may explore whether our finding replicates
in other settings and may possibly develop alterna-
tive measures to assess how well various preference
stage only, they considered on average 11.79 of the 18 cells on the
screen (in this stage only three cards remain on the screen). Note
that the proportion of cells considered in CBC should not be com-
pared directly to the proportion of cells considered in the card
selection stage of Conjoint Poker, because it is likely that respon-
dents remember at least part of the product-related information
acquired during the hand selection stage in the card selection stage.
In Study 3, Conjoint Poker participants considered on average 20.72
of the 24 cells in the hand selection stage and 11.77 of 18 in the card
selection stage.
measurement methods explain and predict real-world
decisions.
3.4. Study 3
Study 2 provided direct evidence that with the exper-
imental design of Study 1, respondents consider more
of the profile-relevant information presented to them
under CP versus CBC. However, this finding may
also be driven by differences in the designs (i.e.,
set of cards) used in the two conditions. In particu-
lar, the minimum-overlap D-efficient design used in
the CBC condition is such that it is very easy for a
respondent to choose profiles based on one attribute
level (or a very small set of attribute levels). Study 3
addresses this alternative explanation by holding the
set of cards constant across the two conditions. In this
study, both conditions used the CP design used in
Studies 1 and 2. Whereas this design is statistically
efficient for CP, there is no apparent reason why it
should increase the amount of information consid-
ered by respondents differently for one method ver-
sus the other. Unfortunately, it was not possible to run
a study in which both methods used the CBC design
from Studies 1 and 2, because this design would lead
to all hands in all rounds in CP having the same
strength (minimal overlap implies that all hands are
double straights). Study 3 was otherwise identical to
Study 2, with N = 18.
The results confirm that CP participants consider
more of the profile-related information compared
with incentive-compatible CBC participants, even
holding the set of cards constant. In particular, CP
participants considered (i.e., had at least one fixation
in the hand selection stage or card selection stage) on
average 21.63 of the 24 cells containing the descrip-
tion of the cards (where the average is taken across
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Figure 8 Study 3—Average Proportion of Cells Visited by Participants in Each Condition
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Note. Each cell contains the level of one attribute for one alternative.
the 20 rounds and across all participants), whereas
incentive-compatible CBC participants considered on
average 16.99 of the 24 cells. The difference in the
average number of cells across respondents is statisti-
cally significant (paired t-test, p-value< 0001), and 17
of the 18 respondents considered more cells on aver-
age under CP versus CBC. The downward trend in
the amount of information considered by respondents
as the questionnaire progresses is also confirmed and
is now statistically significant both for CBC (p-value<
0001) and CP (p-value< 0004); see Figure 8. The aver-
age number of cells considered by respondents in
the external validity task was slightly lower than in
Study 2 and equal to 28.56 (out of 48).
In conclusion, Study 3 suggests that the differences
in the amount of information considered by respon-
dents, which were observed indirectly in Study 1 and
directly in Study 2, were at least partly driven by
inherent differences between the methods and not
only by differences in designs (i.e., sets of cards)
across conditions. The increase in the amount of
profile-related information processed by CP partici-
pants is at least partly a result of the structure of the
task; i.e., CP induces respondents to attend to profile-
related information that they may otherwise ignore in
a repeated choice task.
4. Conclusions
Marketing researchers have become increasingly
interested in improving the quality of preference
measurement data. For instance, a stream of research
in the survey research literature deals with the identifi-
cation of various effects that can influence the accuracy
of people’s responses (see, for example, Baumgartner
and Steenkamp 2001, Tourangeau et al. 2000) and with
mechanisms that may improve the accuracy of these
responses (see, for example, De Jong et al. 2010, who
developed a mechanism for the reporting of sensitive
information).
Similar concerns have been voiced in conjoint
analysis research. One major recent contribution
to the preference measurement literature has been
the development of incentive-compatible mechanisms
that motivate respondents to reveal their prefer-
ences truthfully. Here, we build on that literature to
propose an incentive-compatible preference measure-
ment mechanism that provides formal incentives in
an engaging environment. Based on an online study
and two eye-tracking studies, we provide evidence
that this approach increases the amount of profile-
related information considered by respondents.
Several areas for future research may be identi-
fied. First and as noted above, future research may
explore the generalizability and replicability of our
finding that incentive-compatible CBC predicts out-
of-sample individual choices well but predicts out-of-
sample aggregate choice shares poorly. In our study,
this result seems to have been linked to the exis-
tence of groups of CBC respondents who all gave the
exact same answers to all CBC questions, where these
answers relied on a small subset of the attributes.13
13 Consider, for example, the group of 29 CBC respondents who
always selected laptops with 320 GB hard drives in all calibra-
tion questions. Both external validity profiles with 320 GB hard
drives are attractive to this group of consumers. Because all of these
respondents gave the exact same set of answers to all calibration
questions, the set of predicted out-of-sample choice probabilities
is identical for all these respondents. Moreover, our ability to pre-
dict which of these two 320 GB laptops will be chosen by these
respondents in the external validity task relies only on the use of
shrinkage. In other words, the out-of-sample predictions within the
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Second, additional eye-tracking studies may be run
to explore whether alternative conjoint analysis for-
mats, such as rating-based conjoint analysis, are able
to increase information consideration. Third, future
research may identify situations in which deeper
information processing in preference measurement
tasks is actually not desirable, e.g., because it induces
respondents to pay more attention to information that
they would ignore when making real-life decisions.
A fourth area for future research is the development
and testing of multiplayer versions of Conjoint Poker.
This would raise several issues, including (a) play-
ers may be able to learn each other’s preferences;
(b) players may be able to learn each other’s play-
ing style and, in particular, the propensity to play
the strongest hand; (c) the assumptions made in
Appendix A that the opponent’s cards are drawn
randomly and that the opponent always plays the
strongest available hand would not hold anymore,
and the computation of the probabilities of winning
with each hand would be more complicated; and
(d) the efficiency of each player’s design would be
influenced by each other player’s design (through
the probabilities of winning), and therefore designs
should be optimized jointly across players.
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Appendix A. Hand Probabilities
A.1. Hand Strengths
We show here how to compute the probabilities that each
hand is achievable from a random set of four cards drawn
uniformly without replacement from the set of all possible
cards in the case of A = 6 attributes with four levels each.
The same approach may be used for any other number of
attributes and levels. These probabilities capture the proba-
bility that each hand is achievable by the computer in our
studies (against which our respondents played) and will be
used next to compute the probability of winning with each
hand when playing against the computer.
small set of profiles with 320 GB are “random guesses” driven only
by population-level shrinkage. Because there are only two profiles
with 320 GB, hit rates among these respondents are high (∼50%).
However, aggregate choice share predictions among these respon-
dents are less accurate if the relative shares of these two profiles
are not well predicted.
Let b equal to the probability that four random cards have
at least three different levels on a given attribute: b = 4(42) ·
4 · 3 · 25/44 + 4!/44 = 42/64.
Let c be the probability that at least three of four random
cards have the same level on a given attribute: c = 44 ·4 ·35/
44 + 4/44 = 13/64.
Let d= 1−b−c be the probability that four random cards
are such that two have one level and two have another level
on a given attribute: d= 44 · 3 · 35/44 = 9/64.
Let e the probability that exactly three of four random
cards have the same level on a given attribute given that
they have at least three: e= 444 · 4 · 35/445/413/645= 12/13
Let f be the probability that exactly three of four random
cards have different levels on a given attribute given that at
least three do: f = 44(42) · 4 · 3 · 25/445/442/645= 36/42.
We have the following:
Pr(Double Flush)
=
A∑
k2=2
(
A
k2
)
41 − c5A−k2ck2
(
14k2 > 45+ 14k2 ≤ 45
·
(
1 − ek2 3!
44 − k25!
(
1
4
)k2−1))
0
Pr(Straight Flush)
=
A−1∑
k2=1
A−k2∑
k1=1
(
A
k1
)
·
(
A− k1
k2
)
dA−k1−k2bk1ck2
·
[
1 − f k1ek2
((
1
2
)k1(1
4
)k2−1
+
(
4
2
)(
1
2
)k2
·
(
1 −
(
1
2
)k2−1)(1
6
)k1)]
0
Pr(Flush) = 1 − 41 − c5A0
Pr(Double Straight)
=
A∑
k1=2
(
A
k1
)
· 41 − b5A−k1bk1
·
[
14k1 ≥ 35+ 14k1 ≤ 25·
(
1 − f k1
(
1
6
)k1−1)]
0
Pr(Straight) = 1 − 41 − b5A0
Pr(Pair) = 1 − 4b41 − f 55A0
A.2. Probabilities of Winning Against the Computer
For each round and for each possible hand, we develop
closed-form expressions for the probability of winning if
playing that hand against a player with random cards who
always plays the best hand. We compute Pr(best hand is
Double Flush), Pr(best hand is Straight Flush), Pr(best hand
is Flush), Pr(best hand is Double Straight), Pr(best hand
is Straight), and Pr(best hand is Pair). (It is easy to show
that Pr(not getting anything) = 0.) Then the probability of
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winning with a given hand is the sum of probabilities that
the opponent will get a weaker hand plus half the proba-
bility that the opponent will get a hand of similar strength.
We have the following:
Pr(best hand is Double Flush)
=
A∑
k2=2
(
A
k2
)
41 − c5A−k2ck2
(
14k2 > 45+ 14k2 ≤ 45
·
(
1 − ek2 3!
44 − k25!
(
1
4
)k2−1))
0
Pr(best hand is Straight Flush)
= Pr(Straight Flush, no Double Flush)
=
4∑
k2=1
A−k2∑
k1=1
(
A
k1
)(
A− k1
k2
)
dA−k1−k2bk1ck2
·
[
14k2 = 15+ 14k2 > 15ek2
3!
44 − k25!
(
1
4
)k2−1]
·
14k2 > 25+ 14k2 ≤ 25
1 − f k1 ((4−k22 )
6
)k1 0
Pr(best hand is Flush)
= Pr(Flush, no Straight Flush, no Double Flush)
=
4∑
k2=1
A−k2∑
k1=0
(
A
k1
)(
A− k1
k2
)
dA−k1−k2bk1ck2
·
[
14k2 = 15+ 14k2 > 15ek2
3!
44 − k25!
(
1
4
)k2−1]
·
14k1 = 05+ 14k1 > 05 · 14k2 ≤ 25 · f k1
((4−k2
2
)
6
)k1 0
Pr(best hand is Double Straight)
= Pr(Double Straight, no Flush,
no Straight Flush, no Double Flush)
=
A∑
k1=2
(
A
k1
)
dA−k1bk1
[
14k1 ≥ 35+ 14k1 = 25 ·
5
6
]
0
Pr(best hand is Straight)
= Pr(Straight, no Double Straight, no Flush,
no Straight Flush, no Double Flush)
=
2∑
k1=1
(
6
k1
)
d6−k1bk1
[
14k1 = 15+ 14k1 = 25 ·
1
6
]
0
Pr(best hand is Pair)
= Pr(Pair, no Straight, no Double Straight,
no Flush, no Straight Flush, no Double Flush)
= dA0
Appendix B. Computation of the
Information Matrix
B.1. Homogeneous Case
The log of the likelihood corresponding to a given round r
in which the player played h and chose profile j is
Lr = V rh − log
(∑
h′
exp4V rh′ 5
)
+ xj− log
(∑
j ′∈h
exp4xj ′5
)
1
ïLr = ïV rh −
∑
h′ exp4V rh′ 5ïV
r
h′∑
h′ exp4V rh′ 5
+ xTj −
∑
j ′∈h exp4xj ′5xTj ′∑
j ′∈h exp4xj ′5
= ïV rh −
∑
h′
Pr(h’)ïV rh′ + xTj −
∑
j ′∈h
Pr4j ′5xTj ′ 0
The information matrix for round r is given by
ìr = Ehr 1j44ïLr 54ïLr 5T 5
= ∑
hr
∑
j∈hr
[
ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
Pr4h′r 5ïV
r
h′r +xTj −
∑
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Pr4j ′5xTj ′
]
·
[
ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
Pr4h′r 5·ïV rh′r +xTj −
∑
j ′∈hr
Pr4j ′5xTj ′
]T
·Pr4hr 5Pr4j hr 5
= ∑
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[
ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
Pr4h′r 5ïV
r
h′r
]
·Pr4hr 5
[
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∑
h′r
Pr4h′r 5ïV
r
h′r
]T ∑
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Pr4j hr 5
+∑
hr
Pr4hr 5
∑
j∈hr
[
xTj −
∑
j ′∈hr
Pr4j ′ hr 5xTj ′
]
·Pr4j hr 5
[
xTj −
∑
j ′∈hr
Pr4j ′ hr 5xTj ′
]T
+∑
hr
[
ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
Pr4h′r 5ïV
r
h′r
]
·Pr4hr 5
∑
j∈hr
[
xj
T − ∑
j ′∈hr
Pr4j ′ hr 5x′j T
]T
Pr4j hr 5
= ∑
hr∈r
4z˜rhr Pr4hr 5z˜
T
hrr
+Pr4hr 5
∑
j∈hr
zj hr Pr4j hr 5zTj hr 51
where
z˜rhr = ïV rhr −
∑
h′r
ïV rh′r Pr4h
′
r 5 and
zj hr = xj T −
∑
j ′∈hr
x′j
T Pr4j ′  hr 50
B.2. Mixed Logit Case
In the case of a mixed logit model, following Sandor and
Wedel (2002), we assume that i =  + Ui , where  is a
diagonal matrix and Ui = diag4ui5, where ui ∼ N401 I5. Let
j h =
∫
u
Pr4j  h1u5ê4u5du and
h =
∫
u
Pr4hu5ê4u5du1
where ê is the probability density function of u.
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The log of the likelihood corresponding to a given
round r in which the player chose hand h and profile j may
be written as
Lr = log4h5+ log4j h51
¡Lr
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¡h
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Appendix C. Hierarchical Bayes Estimation
The likelihood function for Conjoint Poker is given by Equa-
tions (2) and (4). The likelihood function for CBC is given
simply by
Pr4j5= exp4xji5∑
j ′∈r exp4xj ′i5
0
Let p be equal to the number of partworths estimated
(p= 18 in our case), and let Ip denote the identity matrix
of size p. The same prior specification was used in both
conditions:14
i ∼ N401D51
D−1 ∼ Wishart40001Ip1 p+ 1551
diffuse improper prior on 0.
In addition, we used the following priors on the addi-
tional parameters in Conjoint Poker:
i ∼ TN401D 5 4truncated between 0 and 251
i ∼ N401D51
D−1 ∼ Gamma411151
D−1 ∼ Gamma411151
diffuse improper prior for 0 and 01
diffuse improper prior on <+ for 0
We used MCMC with 50,000 iterations, using the first
10,000 as burn-in and saving 1 in every 10 iterations
thereafter. Convergence was assessed visually using plots
of the parameters. We used rejection sampling on i to
ensure that i + maxj∈h8xji9≥ 0 for all i and h.
Appendix D. Poker Quiz
Please answer the following questions regarding real poker.
The pot is
—a set of cards placed in the middle of the table.
—an amount of money for which players compete.
—an amount of money that players may borrow during
the game.
To call is
—to discard one’s hand and forfeit interest in the cur-
rent pot.
—to increase the size of the bet required to stay in the
pot.
—to match a bet or match a raise.
To fold is
—to discard one’s hand and forfeit interest in the cur-
rent pot.
—to increase the size of the bet required to stay in the
pot.
—to match a bet or match a raise.
An ante is
—a forced bet in which all players put an equal amount
of money or chips into the pot before the deal begins.
14 Of course, each condition was estimated separately and
independently.
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—the final community card.
—the first three community cards.
A flop is
—a forced bet in which all players put an equal amount
of money or chips into the pot before the deal begins.
—the final community card.
—the first three community cards.
A river is
—a forced bet in which all players put an equal amount
of money or chips into the pot before the deal begins.
—the final community card.
—the first three community cards.
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